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Abstract 
Numerous studies have tried to provide a better understanding of firm-level investment 
behaviour using econometric models. The model specification of more recent studies has been 
based on two main approaches. The first, the real options approach, focuses on irreversibility 
and uncertainty in perfect capital markets; of particular interest is the range of inaction caused 
by sunk costs. The second, the neo-institutional finance theory, emphasises capital market 
imperfections and firms’ released liquidity constraints. Empirical applications of the latter 
theory often refer to linear econometric models to prove these imperfections and thus do not 
account for the range of inaction caused by irreversibility. In this study, a generalised Tobit 
model based on an augmented q model is developed with the intention of considering the 
coexistence of irreversibility and capital market imperfections. Simulation-based experiments 
allow investigating the properties of this model. It can be shown how disregarding 
irreversibility reduces effectiveness of simpler linear models.  
Keywords: q model, uncertainty, capital market imperfections, generalised Tobit model 
JEL Classification: D81, D92, C51 
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1 Introduction  
The understanding of farm investment behaviour is important for economic and policy 
analysis in agriculture. Investments change farm size, the adoption of new technologies 
affects the efficiency of farms, and (dis)investments are the main driving forces of struc-
tural change in agriculture. This paper aims to improve the understanding of investment 
behaviour. 
Empirical results based on the classical static investment model have so far not been satis-
fying (SCHIANTARELLI 1995). This model is defined as a factor demand model for a repre-
sentative firm maximising its value subject to the development of the capital stock over 
time. Assuming perfect capital markets finance is not connected with the investment deci-
sion. Along the optimal path of investments, the cost of acquiring an additional unit of 
capital is equal to the shadow value of capital, q. Further improvements focus on addi-
tional costs when adjusting the capital stock. These are assumed to be strictly convex in 
order to ensure a smooth and linear optimal path of investments. The well known q model 
and the respective dynamic Euler equation approach are special cases of these dynamic 
factor demand models (BOND and VAN REENEN 2003). Two main strands of literature fo-
cus on further developments in order to improve the understanding of investment behav-
iour. In particular, the assumptions of perfect capital markets and strictly convex adjust-
ment costs are questioned, as these assumptions do not allow capturing observed phenom-
ena like a high reluctance to invest or frequent periods of inactivity. 
The real options approach, which has a close relationship to the stochastic adjustment cost 
models, gives explanations for observed lumpiness and investment rigidity even though 
the firm has not reached its desired or target capital stock (see also CABALLERO 1997). 
Lumpy investments mean in this context that investments are undertaken in a relatively 
short period of time followed by periods of zero investment. The presence and interaction 
of irreversible investments, uncertain future revenues and the flexibility in the investment 
decision lead to a range along the optimal path of investment in which waiting is optimal 
(DIXIT and PINDYCK 1994). In other words, investment is influenced by the value of the 
real option to invest whereby delaying the investment becomes optimal. In this context, 
irreversible investment is caused by fixed costs in adjusting the capital stock, while partial 
irreversibility occurs when the sale and purchase prices of capital differ. This wedge in-
troduces a piecewise linear function of the adjustment costs which kinks at zero invest-
ment (HAMERMESH and PFANN 1996). ABEL and EBERLY (1994; 1996) provide an ex-
tended q model and show thereby that strictly convex adjustment costs cannot explain in-
vestment rigidity. 
In contrast, the second approach – the neo-institutional finance theory – explicitly consid-
ers imperfect capital markets. Asymmetric information and agency problems induce addi-
tional transaction costs leading to different interest rates for debt and equity capital, and 
unequal capital prices for firms as well as uncertain future expectations (SCHIANTARELLI 
1995). In this context, maximisation of firms’ net income is subject to additional restric-
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tions, e.g., financing constraints. A firm is constrained if an increase in internal finance 
sources causes an increase in investment. Hence, investment is strongly influenced by in-
ternal financing abilities and sub-optimal compared to a perfect capital market. A widely 
used approach is to proxy the missing information in q by additional explanatory vari-
ables. As a consequence, investment and financial decisions are not separable. A compre-
hensive survey about capital market imperfections is given by HUBBARD (1998).  
To our knowledge literature does not provide empirical work about irreversible invest-
ment in imperfect capital markets (LENSINK and BO 2001). In order to improve the under-
standing of farm level investment behaviour we suggest a non-linear model specification 
to account for irreversibility and coexistent capital market imperfections affecting the in-
vestment activity. Thereby we aim to identify the expected bias when either one of the 
aspects sunk costs in connection with uncertainty or capital market imperfections is not 
considered in empirical investment models. For this purpose we refer to ABEL and 
EBERLY (1994) and broaden this model to take additionally financial variables into ac-
count. Based on this we derive an econometric model, which controls for the range of in-
action and capital market imperfections. By using simulated data we intend to show the 
advantage of the more generalised model in order to understand empirical investments. 
Therefore, additionally a simpler linear model is estimated serving as a benchmark for the 
generalised specification.  
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. After a literature review of empirical 
work about investments we present the normative investment model. Subsequently, we 
derive the appropriate econometric model specification and apply this model to simulated 
data. The paper closes with a brief summary and conclusions. 
2 Review of Empirical Investment Literature  
Empirical investment literature aims to find evidence for hypothesises derived from the 
aforementioned theoretical concepts. The q model in its simplest form assumes perfect 
capital markets and strictly convex costs attached to adjusting the capital stock and re-
gresses investments on q and capital cost. Within the Euler investment equation approach 
the solved first order condition for investment is estimated using a dynamic model speci-
fication. The use of panel data requires the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) 
(ARELLANO and BOND 1991; BLUNDELL and BOND 1998).  
In order to account for capital market frictions the models developed under the assumption 
of perfect capital markets are extended by proxies for the availability of internal funds, 
e.g., the cash flow. The empirical significance of those is tested to give evidence on im-
perfect capital markets. Therefore, the sample must be partitioned referring to the prob-
ability that a firm is affected by informational shortcomings. A major problem in empiri-
cal work is the choice of the sample separation criterion (SCHIANTARELLI 1995). WHITED 
(1992) partitions the sample based on a measure of financial distress of the firms. BOND 
and MEGHIR (1994) present a direct test of the empirical impacts of the hierarchy of the 
finance model specification for UK panel data. Alternatively, GILCHRIST and 
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HIMMELBERG (1995) extend the standard q model using a vector autoregressive model 
(VAR). This enables to estimate the shadow value of capital q and the investment rate si-
multaneously. The cash flow, which proxies internal financial sources, is confirmed as an 
investment fundamental1. LAGERQVIST and OLSON (2001) provide an empirical Euler 
equation for farm investments. Thereby a second Euler equation for finance is also esti-
mated. The results endorse agency problems and asymmetric information affecting farms’ 
capital structure.  
CABALLERO (1997) gives an overview about empirical investment models considering 
lumpy and irreversible investments. For instance ABEL and EBERLY (2002) provide em-
pirical evidence on asymmetric and non-linear paths of investments. NILSEN and 
SCHIANTARELLI (2003) use Norwegian firm level panel data to explain non-smooth in-
vestment behaviour and take non-convex adjustment costs into account. The results state a 
significant probability of periods of high investments. VERICK et al. (2004) assume that 
the firm faces two decisions – investment in replacement and investment in the expansion 
of the capital stock. The used German plant level data set allows identifying both regimes 
facing different types of adjustment costs. Table 1 summarizes further empirical invest-
ment studies.  
The empirical applications so far emphasise how investment is affected by imperfect capi-
tal markets and the presence of irreversibility. However, to our knowledge empirical ap-
plications do not provide any ‘bridging’ application to irreversible investment in an im-
perfect capital market. In the following section we present our suggestion to consider both 
issues while explaining investment behaviour at the firm level.  
                                                          
1
 It should be noted that ERICKSON and WHITED (2000) discuss possible measurement problems of q, which 
might lead to significant variables that are often used to proxy imperfect capital markets.  
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Table 1:  Empirical Studies about the Relation of Investments and Imperfect Capital Markets  
Authors (Year) Approach Econometric Model Specification 
Endogenous Vari-
able  Exogenous Variables Sector/Country/Data 
Estima-
tion  Hypotheses/Results  
FAZZARI and  
ATHEY (1987) 
Capital Asset Pricing 
Model, Credit Rationing 
Theory 
Static Regression Investment rate Sales, CF 1), interest payments 
and depreciation  
Industry 
USA 
Panel data  
(1975-1985) 
GLS 2)   Significant impact of financing con-
straints on the firm investment 
BOND and MEGHIR 
(1994) 
Euler Investment Equa-
tion, Pecking Order 
Theory 
Dynamic Regression Investment rate Lagged investment rate,   
output-capital ratio,              
CF-capital ratio, leverage 
Industry 
UK 
Panel data 
(1968-1986) 
GMM 3) Positive relationship between  
investment and availability of internal 
funds (CF)  
CARTER  and 
OLINTO (2003) 
Credit Rationing, 
Property Rights Theory 
 
Switching Regression 
 
Capital stock Farm size, leased and own 
land; dummies for farm types 
Agriculture 
Paraguay 
Panel data 
(1991-1994) 
OLS-FD 4)   Significant positive impact of the 
property rights reform on the  
investment activity of large farms  
GILCHRIST and 
HIMMELBERG 
(1995) 
q Model VAR5) Investment rate  Tobin’s q, marginal q, CF Capital market 
USA  
Compustat Data 
(1979-1989) 
GMM 3) Contrary to marginal q, Tobin’s q 
overestimates the CF sensitivity of 
investment decisions, in particular for 
financially constrained firms  
BIERLEN and 
FEATHERSTONE 
(1998) 
q Model VAR5)   Investment rate Marginal q, CF Agriculture 
USA 
Panel data 
(1976-1992) 
GMM 3) Leverage ratio is the most important 
determinant of credit constraints;  
capital stock and other farm character-
istics are less significant factors 
HU and 
SCHIANTARELLI 
(1998) 
q Model Switching Regression Investment rate Market value-capital ratio,  
CF-capital ratio 
Industry 
USA 
Panel data  
(1978-1987) 
ML 6)    Different impact of capital market 
imperfections on the firms’ investment 
behaviour, depending on firm 
characteristics and macroeconomic 
environment  
BARRY et al. (2000) q Model,  
Pecking Order Theory  
VAR5) Short and long term 
debt, leasing pay-
ments, investment  
Marginal q, CF, lagged debt 
and leasing payments 
Agriculture 
USA 
Panel data 
(1987-1994) 
GMM 3) 
 
Significant positive relationship 
between CF and investment; long-term 
adjustment of the capital structure  
ERICKSON and 
WHITED (2000) 
q Model Static Regression Investment rate Marginal q, CF Industry 
USA 
Panel data  
(1992-1995) 
OLS 7)   
GMM 3) 
Contrary to q, CF does not explain 
investment behaviour of either  
financially constrained or uncon-
strained firms  
GOMES (2001) q Model Static Regression Investment rate Tobin’s q, CF Industry 
USA 
Panel data 
(1979-1988) 
OLS 7)   Overestimated CF sensitivity of  
investment because of the q   
measurement errors and identification 
problems  
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Table 1:  Empirical Studies about the Relation of Investments and Imperfect Capital Markets 
(Continued) 
 
Authors (Year) Approach Econometric Model Specification 
Endogenous Vari-
able  Exogenous Variables Sector/Country/Data 
Estima-
tion  Hypotheses/Results  
LAGERKVIST and 
OLSON (2001) 
Euler Investment Equa-
tion, Agency Theory 
Dynamic Regression Investment rate Leverage Agriculture 
USA 
Panel data 
(1989-1998) 
GMM 3) Agency problems and informational 
asymmetries influence either capital 
structure and capital accumulation   
BENJAMIN and 
PHIMISTER (2002) 
q Model, Euler Invest-
ment Equation, Pecking 
Order Theory 
VAR 3), 
Dynamic Regression 
Investment rate Output, CF, marginal q, equity  Agriculture  
UK and France 
Panel data  
(1987-1992) 
GMM 3) 
 
Different sensitivity of investment to CF 
according to the country and investment 
type  
LIZAL and SVEJNAR 
(2002) 
Credit Rationing Theory, 
Soft Budget Constraints 
Theory 
Static Regression Investment rate Profit-capital ratio, output-
capital-ratio 
Industry  
Czech Republic  
Panel data 
(1992-1998) 
OLS 7)   Enterprises aim at profit maximisation; 
however, large firms operate under soft 
budget constraints, whilst small firms 
are often credit rationed  
HANOUSEK and 
FILER (2004) 
Credit Rationing Theory, 
Soft Budget Constraints 
Theory 
Static Regression Investment rate Profit-capital ratio, output-
capital ratio 
Industry  
Czech Republic  
Panel data 
(1993-1998) 
IV 8)    
OLS 7)   
Positive relationship between profit and 
investment indicates no credit rationing 
but the better investment opportunities;                       
SBC are firm specific  
PAVEL et al. (2004) Credit Rationing Theory Switching Regression 
 
Investment rate Marginal q, CF Industry  
Ukraine 
Panel data 
(1993-1998) 
ML 6)    Credit rationing hypothesis is verified; 
financially constrained firms are smaller 
and have higher capital productivity 
than unconstrained firms  
RIZOV (2004) Euler Investment Equa-
tion, Credit Rationing 
Theory, Soft Budget 
Constraints Theory 
Dynamic Regression  Investment rate Lagged investment rate,  
CF-capital ratio, output-capital 
ratio, leverage 
Industry 
Romania 
Panel data 
(1995-1999) 
GMM 3) 
 
The SBC hypothesis confirmed; firms 
with unconstrained credit access reveal 
a weaker CF sensitivity of investment 
decisions 
1) 
  CF  = Cash Flow 
2)
  GLS = Generalized Least Squares 
3)
  GMM = Generalized Method of Moments  
4)   OLS-FD = Ordinary Least Squares with First Differences 
5)
  VAR = Vector of Autoregressive Equations 
6)   ML = Maximum Likelihood 
7)   OLS  = Ordinary Least Squares 
8)   IV  = Instrumental Variables Estimator 
 
Source: Own presentation 
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3 Methodological approach: A q Model for Irreversible Investments 
in Imperfect Capital Markets 
The dynamic and stochastic adjustment cost model in line with ABEL and EBERLY (1994) is 
extended in order to account for additional transaction cost induced by imperfect capital mar-
kets. We present first the theoretical model and then the empirical (econometric) model speci-
fication.  
3.1 Theoretical Model 
The partial equilibrium model comprises production and investments for a representative 
firm2. The relationship between product price p  and quantity y  in continuous time t  is 
described by an iso-elastic demand function: 
(1) )()()( /)1( tXtytp ⋅= − ψψ , where 1≥ψ .
 
ψ  refers to the price elasticity of demand and X  is a stochastic demand parameter which 
exhibits Geometric Brownian Motion (GBM)  
(2) dX X dt X dzµ σ= ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ , 
where µ  denotes the drift rate, σ  the standard deviation and dz  is a Wiener increment. 
The output y follows a Cobb-Douglas production function 
(3) αα −⋅⋅= 1KLAy , 
where A  denotes a technology parameter, L  refers to labour and K  refers to capital. α  
describes the production elasticity of labour whereas labour input can be adjusted without 
additional costs. The profit function is derived using the necessary conditions for profit-
maximising labour input. Operating profit pi  is defined as 
(4) KX KXh ηηpi ⋅⋅= , 
where h > 03. Xh X η⋅  refers to the marginal revenue product of capital at time t, 
1
1
1
>
−
=
α
η X  and 1=Kη .  
The adjustment cost function of capital input, )(IC , has three parts, one for each activity: 
investment, disinvestment and inaction. The respective parts consist of three terms: the 
fixed costs a, the capital costs 1b  and 2b  which are linear in )(tI  and the internal adjust-
ment costs 1γ  and 2γ  which are quadratic in )(tI  and strictly convex (BÖHM et al. 1999). 
                                                          
2
 We suppress the time variable t where possible.  
3
 ( ) ( ) ( )
11 11h A
α
α ααα
ω
−
−
 
= − ⋅ ⋅ 
 
 (ABEL and EBERLY 1994). 
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(5) 





⋅+⋅+
⋅+⋅+
=
2
22
2
11
0)(
IIba
IIba
IC
γ
γ
 
if 0>I  
if 0=I  
if 0<I , 
where 1b  denotes the cost for capital when investing and 2b  denotes the respective cost 
when disinvesting. It is essential that 021 ≥≥ bb  and 0, 21 ≥γγ . If 21 bb >  and 0a ≥  hold, 
then the investment costs are sunken and thus the investment decision is characterised by 
irreversibility. This induces the range of inaction.  
In general, the objective of the representative firm is the maximisation of the present value 
of net income depending upon the current capital stock 0K  and the initial stochastic de-
mand variable 0X . Therefore we define the value-function V as the result of the maximi-
sation. 
(6) 0 0
0
( , ) max ( )X K r t
I
V K X E h X K C I e dtη η
∞
− ⋅ = ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ ∫ , 
where r  denotes the discount rate. The maximisation is subject to the evolvement of the 
capital stock over time: 
(7) dtKIdK )( ⋅−= δ , 
where δ  describes the depreciation rate. In accordance with the dynamic programming 
approach the optimal path of investment follows the Bellman equation.  
(8) 






+−⋅⋅=⋅
dt
dVEICKXhXKVr KX
I
][)(max),( ηη . 
Equation (8) requires the return Vr ⋅  to equal the sum of profit X Kh X Kη η⋅ ⋅ , adjustment 
costs for capital stock, ( )C I− , and the expected capital gain [ ]E dV dt . Applying Ito’s 
Lemma for solving dV , taking into account [ ] 0E z =  and using equation (2) leads to the 
following expression for [ ]E dV : 
(9) 
K
VKI
X
VX
X
VX
dt
dVE
∂
∂
⋅⋅−+
∂
∂
⋅⋅⋅+
∂
∂
⋅⋅= )(
2
1][
02
2
22 δσµ . 
Inserting equation (9) in (8) gives: 
(10) 






∂
∂
⋅⋅−+
∂
∂
⋅⋅⋅+
∂
∂
⋅⋅+−⋅=⋅
K
VKI
X
VX
X
VXICKXhVr KX
I
)(
2
1)(max 02
2
22 δσµηη . 
We now define q V K= ∂ ∂  as the marginal valuation of a unit of installed capital. The 
optimal path of investment solves the term: 
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(11) { }qIIC
I
⋅+− )(max . 
The necessary conditions are: 
(12a) 0)2( 11 =+⋅+− qIb γ  
(12b) 0)2( 22 =+⋅+− qIb γ . 
Solving the equations (12a) and (12b) gives the optimal investment ( 1I ) and disinvestment 
( 2I ) volumes. These are functions of q, the price of capital, and the slope parameters of 
the adjustment cost function: 
(13a) qbI ⋅+−=
11
1
1 2
1
2 γγ
 
(13b) qbI ⋅+−=
22
2
2 2
1
2 γγ
. 
Since the maximand in equation (11) is equal to zero when the firm does neither invest 
nor disinvest 1I  and 2I  are only optimal when 0)( 2/12/1 ≥⋅+− qIIC  holds. The roots of 
the terms 0)( 11 =⋅+− qIIC  and 0)( 22 =⋅+− qIIC , respectively, are: 
(14a) abq ⋅⋅+= 111 2 γ  
(14b) abq ⋅⋅−= 222 2 γ . 
If q lies between the lower threshold, 2q , and the upper threshold, 1q , neither investments 
nor disinvestments are optimal. This is also known as the range of inaction. The optimal 
(dis)investment strategy is characterised by three regimes: 
(15) 
1II =  
0=I  
2II =  
if 1qq >  
if 12 qqq ≤≤  
if 2qq < . 
Imperfect capital markets occur in different ways (CHATELAIN 2002) 
– In limited liability companies different costs for retained profits and acquired venture 
capital arise because of tax schemes or transaction costs.  
– Bankruptcy risks and monitoring expenses induce transaction costs leading to higher 
costs for debt capital than for equity capital.  
– Firms might also be credit constrained for the same reasons.  
Literature offers several approaches to model the impacts of imperfect capital markets. A 
common way of modelling is to define a financial variable (e.g., liquidity or debt capital 
stock) as an additional state or control variable. This is accompanied by an additional 
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constraint accounting for the upper limit of bank loans or new indebtedness, see for instance 
RIZOV (2004) or WHITED and WU (2006). Alternatively, LAGERQVIST and OLSEN (2001) 
assume that additional adjustment costs arise when the borrowed capital stock changes. We 
refer to the latter suggestion and implement the additional transaction costs in the context of 
imperfect capital markets into the adjustment cost function. The main advantage is that the 
dimensions of the model are not increased. In what follows we assume that the adjustment 
costs depend additionally on the internal financial power defined as the relation of the cash 
flow (CF) to investments. To be precise, adjustment costs now depend not only on 
investments but also on the firms’ cash flow,  
(16) 







⋅+⋅+⋅+
⋅+⋅+⋅+
=
CF
IdIIba
CF
IdIIba
CFIC
2
2
22
1
2
11
0),(
γ
γ
 
if 0>I  
if 0=I  
if 0<I . 
Financial ability now affects the range of inaction and also the optimal investment volume 
if capital markets are imperfect. The financial ability widens the range of inaction, such 
that the larger (smaller) the cash flow, the weaker (stronger) the internal financing is and 
the smaller (larger) the increase of the range of inaction is. The thresholds are defined as 
functions of the cash flow and are no longer constant, 
(17a) 
CF
d
abq 1111 2 +⋅⋅+= γ  
(17b) 
CF
d
abq 2222 2 +⋅⋅−= γ . 
Moreover, the cash flow indirectly affects the optimal (dis)investment volume due to the 
modified adjustment cost function. Given an active regime, the optimal investment vol-
ume depends on the price for capital, q and cash flow:  
(18a) 1 1
1
1 1 1
1 1
2 2 2
b dI q
CFγ γ γ
= − + ⋅ − ⋅  
(18b)
 
2 2
2
2 2 2
1 1
2 2 2
b dI q
CFγ γ γ
= − + ⋅ − ⋅ . 
The extended model describes the optimal investment strategy and takes into account irre-
versible investment while the firm acts in an imperfect capital market. Figure 1 illustrates 
the relation between (dis)investment I, the shadow value of capital q and the cash flow CF 
derived from a simulated data sample.  
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Figure 1:  Representation of the relation of q, cash flow and (dis)investments  
 
I 
CF 
q 
0 
 
3.2 Econometric Model Specification  
Figure 1 apparently implies the use of a non-linear econometric model to explain the rela-
tionship of investment, q and the cash flow appropriately. In particular, we refer to a gen-
eralised double censored Tobit specification (CAMERON and TRIVEDI 2005; DI IORIO and 
FACHIN 2006) or two-sided generalized Tobit model. According to MADDALA (1983) the 
latent variables are defined as 
(19a) 1 11 1
1 1 1
1 1
2 2 2it it itit
b dI q
CF
ε
γ γ γ
∗
= − + ⋅ − ⋅ +  
(19b) * 2 22 2
2 2 2
1 1
2 2 2it it itit
b dI q
CF
ε
γ γ γ
= − + ⋅ − ⋅ + , 
where i indexes firms ( 1,....., )i N=  and t indexes time ( 1,....., )t T= ; it1ε  and it2ε  are two 
normally independently distributed error terms (n.i.d.) with variances 
1
2
εσ  and 2
2
εσ , respec-
tively. The error terms reflect idiosyncratic shocks which are not observable to the eco-
nometrician and may also include some measurement errors. The latent variables *1itI  and 
*
2itI  describe a target investment volume in order to deliver the desired amount of output 
under standard operating conditions. However, the variable of interest, itI , is observable. 
As described in the previous section the firm invests or disinvests if itq  passes the respec-
tive thresholds 1itq  and 2itq . Hence, observed investment can be modelled as: 
(20) 
*
1 1
2 1
*
2 2
if 0
0 if 0
if 0.
it it it it
it it it it it
it it it it
I I q q
I q q q q
I I q q
= − >
= − ≥ ≥ −
= − <
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The stochastic representation of the thresholds 1q  and 2q  is 
(21a) 11 1 1 12it it
it
dq b a v
CF
γ= + ⋅ ⋅ + +  
(21b) 22 2 2 22it it
it
dq b a v
CF
γ= − ⋅ ⋅ + + ,  
where 1itv  and 2itv  are two independent standard normally distributed error terms with 
zero mean. These error terms account for idiosyncratic shocks that are not observable to 
the econometrician. Accordingly, investment occurs as 
(22a) * 1 11 1
1 1 1
1 1
2 2 2it it it itit
b dI I q
CF
ε
γ γ γ
= = − + ⋅ − ⋅ + , 
when:  
(22b) 11 1 1( 2 ) 0it it
it
db a q v
CF
γ− − ⋅ ⋅ + − − >  . 
Disinvestment occurs as 
(23a) * 2 22 2
2 2 2
1 1
2 2 2it it it itit
b dI I q
CF
ε
γ γ γ
= = − + ⋅ − ⋅ + , 
when  
(23b) 22 2 2( 2 ) 0it it
it
db a q v
CF
γ− + ⋅ ⋅ + − − < . 
We assume that the error terms 1/ 2itε  and 1/ 2itv  are uncorrelated. This restrictive assump-
tion allows specifying the model as a double hurdle model introduced by CRAGG (1971). 
This is an alternative specification of the Tobit model for corner solutions (WOOLDRIDGE 
2002, p. 538). The assumption of uncorrelated error terms enables to estimate the model in 
two parts. Furthermore, we abstract from unobserved heterogeneity to simplify the estima-
tion4. In the first part we estimate an ordered probit model to obtain the probabilities of 
being in one of the regimes. The results allow to identify the thresholds 1itq  and 2itq . The 
probability of being in the investment regime is given by: 
(24a) 
11 1 1Pr ( ) Pr ( 0) ( )itit it it it v it itq q q q q q> = − > = Φ − . 
Accordingly, the probability of being in the disinvestment regime refers to: 
(24b) 
22 2 2Pr ( ) Pr ( 0) 1 ( )itit it it it v it itq q q q q q< = − < = − Φ − . 
                                                          
4
 Possible error term structures and the consideration of more complex estimation procedure as well as the panel 
data specifications according to unobserved heterogeneity are left for future research. 
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and finally, the probability of inactivity is:  
(24c) 
1 22 1 1 2Pr ( ) ( ) ( )it itit it it v it it v it itq q q q q q q≤ ≤ = Φ − − Φ − . 
Thus, we define the likelihood function for the ordered probit model:  
(25) 
( )
( ) ( )( )
( )( )
0 0 1 1 2 2
1
0 1 2
1
1 1
0 1 2 0 1 2
0
1
0 1 2
1
( , , , , , , , )
1 .
it it it
it it
it it it it
it it
L I q CF
q CF
q CF q CF
q CF
γ γ γ γ γ γ
γ γ γ
γ γ γ γ γ γ
γ γ γ
+ − + − + −
+ + + −
+ + + − − − − −
− − − −
−
=
 Φ + ⋅ + ⋅ ×
 
   Φ + ⋅ + ⋅ − Φ + ⋅ + ⋅ ×
   
 
− Φ + ⋅ + ⋅
 
∏
∏
∏
 
The parameters are defined as follows: 
1
1
0 2γ
b
c −=+ , 
2
2
0 2γ
b
c −=− , 0 1 1( 2 )b aγ γ+ = − − ⋅ ⋅ , 
0 2 2( 2 )b aγ γ− = − + ⋅ ⋅ , 
1
1 2
1
γ
=
+c , 
2
1 2
1
γ
=
−c , 
1
1
2 2γ
d
c −=+ , 
2
2
2 2γ
d
c −=− , 1 1 1γ γ+ −= = , 
2 1dγ + = − , 2 2dγ − = − .  
We use a state variable to indicate whether investment, disinvestment or inaction is ob-
served. Accordingly, 
1
∏ and 
1−
∏  include observations of (dis)investments and 
0
∏ in-
cludes observations referring to the range of inaction.  
In the second part the investment and disinvestment equations (22a) and (23a) are esti-
mated separately by ordinary least squares (OLS) using the respective observed data in the 
regimes. Because of the uncorrelated error terms there is no need to estimate the invest-
ment and disinvestment equation conditional on being in the regime.  
Our aim is to quantify the bias which is likely when using simple linear models without 
consideration of the range of inaction in this context. Therefore we construct a simplified 
linear econometric model for which the generalised Tobit model serves as a benchmark:  
(26) 0 1 2
1b
it it it
it
I c c q c u
CF
= + ⋅ + ⋅ + , where ( )2~ . . . 0, uu i i d σ . 
The superscript b denotes benchmark. This general kind of model can be found in 
BENJAMIN and PHIMISTER (2002), BIERLEN and FEATHERSTONE (1998) or RIZOV (2004). 
To avoid any misunderstandings the used investment models in these publications are 
more complex than the defined benchmark model, for instance the models are still linear 
but also dynamic. If imperfect capital markets and irreversibility coexist we conjecture 
that a disregard of irreversibility and uncertainty within the estimation like in equation 
(26) leads to biased results. This may in particular cause problems when the aim is to find 
evidence on imperfect capital markets. 
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4 Simulation Experiments 
We conduct Monte Carlo simulations to prove the above mentioned concerns about a pos-
sible bias. Thereby the drawings and the estimations are repeated 1 000 times. We use the 
mean of the estimated coefficient and the respective standard error to obtain the final re-
sults. Simulation runs are preferred towards empirical data in order to control for the 
complexity of the data generating process and the parameters are known. This allows find-
ing out about the behaviour of both models. For simplification reasons and to avoid biases 
we abstract from firm individual specific and time effects which are very likely in empiri-
cal panel data. In what follows first the scenarios and the data simulation are presented 
(subsection 4.1) and afterwards the simulation results are shown (subsection 4.2).  
4.1 Data and Scenarios 
Panel data at the firm level are generated based on the theoretical investment model de-
scribed in section three5. Table 2 explains briefly the structure of the scenarios, which dif-
fer by the presence of irreversibility and the assumption of a perfect or imperfect capital 
market. Furthermore, the detailed parameter assumptions can be found in table 2. 
                                                          
5
 For the simulation and estimation we used STATA 10.  
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Table 2:  Parameter Assumptions in the Simulation-Based Experiments  
Scenario Assumptions Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
Capital Market imperfect perfect perfect
Range of inaction induced by irreversibility yes yes no 
Symbol Description
r Discount rate 5% 5% 5%
δ Depreciation rate 5% 5% 5%
µ Drift rate of the demand parameter 0% 0% 0%
σ Standard deviation of the demand parameter 10% 10% 10%
η X Represents returns to scale and the competition 1.001 1.001 1.001
parameter of demand
η Κ Represents returns to scale and the competition 1 1 1
parameter of capial
a Fixed costs of investment vs. disinvestment 2 2 0
independent of the current amount
b 1 Price per unit of capital to be invested 9.5 9.5 8
γ 1 Adjustment cost parameter 0.5 0.5 0.5
in the case of investment
d 1 Weighting coefficient of the inverse 10 0 0
internal financial power in the case of investment
b 2 Price per unit of capital to be disinvested 8 8 8
γ 2 Adjustment cost parameter 0.1 0.1 0.5
in the case of disinvestment
d 2 Weighting coefficient of the inverse -10 0 0
internal financial power in the case of disinvestment
 
 
For all scenarios we simulate N = 5 000 farms over T = 20 years. In detail we proceed as 
follows.  
– Profit itpi  of farm i  at time t  follows a discrete time version of equation (4). The farm 
individual initial capital stock is generated by a random number. Based on this 
initialisation the further evolvement of the capital stock follows (7). The depreciation 
rate δ  is assumed to be 5 %. According to equation (2) the stochastic demand 
parameter itX  is modelled as GBM without Drift (i.e., %0=µ ) but with standard 
deviation σ  of 10 %. For simplification the parameter h  is modelled as a positive 
constant.  
– The adjustment costs for the capital stock ( , )it itC I CF  are modelled referring to 
equation (16).  
– The cash flow, itCF , is modelled as the sum of profit and depreciation, and is endued 
with a uniformly distributed error term ite  between 0 and 0.3: 
     (27) ( )it it it itCF K epi δ= + ⋅ ⋅ . 
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– The thresholds itq1  and itq2  follow equations (14a) and (14b). The data generating 
process of the optimal path of investment, itI , is described in equation (15). We use 
(18a) for investments and (18b) for disinvestments ( 2I ).  
– Under the assumption of constant returns to scale and perfect competition the 
differential equation in (10) and the value function (6) become linear in K . This allows 
to derive an analytical solution for itq  (ABEL und EBERLY 1994): 
     (28) 
))1(
2
1( 2 −⋅⋅−⋅−+
⋅
=
XXX
itit
it
r
Xh
q
X
ηησµηδ
η
, 
where r  is the riskless interest rate and assumed to be 5 %. Regarding (27) it becomes 
obvious that itq  is determined by the parameters of the stochastic part of demand 
function, itX : the drift rate, µ , the standard deviation, σ , as well as the competition 
parameter, Xη .  
– The relationship between investment, cash flow and q is overlaid by normally 
distributed shocks it1ε  and it2ε  with a variance of one half according to equations (24a) 
and (24b). Furthermore, the thresholds 1itq  and 2itq  are overlaid by standard normally 
distributed error terms 1itv  and 2itv  referring to equations (21a) and (21b)6. 
We simulate and estimate both models for three different scenarios (cf. Table 2). In the 
first scenario we regard investment behaviour in an imperfect capital market with irre-
versibility implying differing investment and disinvestment functions and a present range 
of inaction. Additionally, the cash flow affects the decision of whether to invest or not and 
the decision of how much to invest. Therefore a positive value for parameters 1d  and 2d  
is chosen. In the second scenario, we look at sunk costs caused by irreversibility under 
conditions of a perfect capital market. This implies that the cash flow does not affect in-
vestments or disinvestments but a range of inactivity exists. In both scenarios, one and 
two, we explicitly model sunk costs in order to ensure a range of inaction. This is 
achieved by choosing different parameters for the costs or revenues per unit capital for 
investments and disinvestments such that 021 >> bb  and fixed costs are assumed, i.e. 
0≠a . The slope parameters 1γ  and 2γ  of the adjustment cost function are unequal induc-
ing different speeds of adjustment of the capital stock. In the third scenario a perfect capi-
tal market without range of inaction is assumed meaning unequal capital cost for invest-
ments and disinvestments, no fixed costs and there is no cash flow effect, neither on the 
decision to invest/disinvest nor on the investment/disinvestment volume. Thereby only a 
random number is observed in the inactivity regime, e.g., firms that have already reached 
the desired capital stock.  
                                                          
6
 It should be noted that the results are sensitive to the specification of the error terms.  
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4.2  Results 
In what follows we present the results of the simulation based experiments. For each scenario 
we simulate the data and estimate the generalised Tobit model as well as the benchmark 
model with 1 000 replications. The results of the first part, the ordered probit model, have 
been fully satisfying for all scenarios. We aim at identifying the bias when the range of 
inaction is ignored in investment regressions and thus we disclaim presenting the results of 
the ordered probit model.  
In scenario 1, a range of inaction and an impact of the cash flow are modelled representing the 
most realistic case. In table 4 the averages of the 1 000 replications of the estimates and the 
respective standard errors as well as the mean R-squares for both models are given. The 
results show that both models give the correct estimates. However, regarding the goodness of 
fit measure, the results of the benchmark model are less satisfactory. This implies a weaker fit 
when disregarding the range of inaction. 
Table 4:  Results of Scenario 1 (Irreversibility of Investments under Imperfect Capi-
tal Markets) 
estimate standard error estimate standard error pre-setting
c 0
+
-9.4996 (0.0150)*** -9.50
c 0
-
-39.9851 (0.0137)*** -40.00
c 1
+ 1.0000 (0.0010)*** 1.00
c 1
- 4.9972 (0.0019)*** 5.00
c 2
+
-15.0000 (0.0006)*** -15.00
c 2
-
-50.0000 (0.0001)*** -50.00
R 2 --
Note: Single (*), double (**) and triple (***) asterisks denote significant at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.  
Source: Own calculations based on 1 000 replications. 
-42.4859
99.99 %+ / 99.21 % -
constant
q
cash flow
92.95%
Benchmark Model Tobit Model (2nd part)
(0.2338)***
(0.0252)***
-27.0698
2.5035
(0.4592)***
 
In this context it is interesting to find out about the performance of the benchmark model 
when capital markets are perfect. Accordingly, in scenario 2 an explicit range of inaction is 
modelled but without any cash flow impacts. The results are shown in table 5. 
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Table 5:  Results Scenario 2 (Irreversibility of investments under perfect capital 
markets) 
estimate standard error estimate standard error pre-setting
c 0
+
-9.5001 (0.0142)*** -9.50
c 0
-
-39.9415 (0.0219)*** -40.00
c 1
+ 1.0000 (0.0010)*** 1.00
c 1
- 4.9892 (0.0036)*** 5.00
c 2
+
-0.0001 (0.0013) 0.00
c 2
- 0.0000 (0.0002) 0.00
R 2 --
Note: Single (*), double (**) and triple (***) asterisks denote significant at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.  
Source: Own calculations based on 1 000 replications. 
97.49 %+ / 99.21 % -
constant
q
cash flow
69.23%
Benchmark Model Tobit Model (2nd part)
(0.0029)***
(0.0006)**
-13.9324
1.3513
-0.0012
(0.0302)***
 
Even though a cash flow effect is not modelled the benchmark model shows a significant 
parameter estimate. The coefficient is very low; however, the resulting conclusion would 
indicate capital market frictions. Comparing the results with the second stage Tobit 
regressions, the goodness of fit in the benchmark model is comparable low, particularly in the 
context of simulated data.  
In scenario 3, the impact of the cash flow is zero and the range of inaction is not modelled. 
However, 12.57 % of the observations are still within the inaction regime which is induced by 
the random error terms. This could be firms that have already reached their desired capital 
stock. Table 6 depicts the results showing correct estimates for both models. It should be 
noted, for the disinvestment regime the Tobit model delivers estimates which slightly differ 
from the pre-setting. 
Table 6:  Results Scenario 3 (Full reversibility of investments under perfect capital 
markets) 
estimate standard error estimate standard error pre-setting
c 0
+
-8.0000 (0.0080)*** -8.00
c 0
-
-7.5030 (0.0223)*** -8.00
c 1
+ 1.0000 (0.0007)*** 1.00
c 1
- 0.8999 (0.0034)*** 1.00
c 2
+ 0.0000 (0.0005) 0.00
c 2
- 0.0000 (0.0007) 0.00
R 2 --
Note: Single (*), double (**) and triple (***) asterisks denote significant at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.  
Source: Own calculations based on 1 000 replications. 
constant
q
cash flow
97.17% 96.99 %+ / 76.96 % -
Benchmark Model Tobit Model (2nd part)
0.0000 (0.0003)
-8.0986 (0.0059)***
1.0053 (0.0006)***
 
Summarizing, under conditions of a perfect capital market, the results of simpler linear 
models show a significant cash flow parameter if the range of inaction induced by irre-
versibility is not considered. Irreversible investments inducing a range of inaction are 
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falsely interpreted as capital market imperfections. Generally, it can be concluded that the 
cash flow accounts also for the irreversible investment decision beyond financial con-
straints. In empirical applications this bias may even be higher as it is overlaid by missing 
information in poor proxy variables for q (ERICKSON and WHITED 2000).  
5 Conclusions and Outlook 
In this paper, we identify the bias when irreversibility in imperfect capital markets is not 
adequately considered by investment models. Therefore we define an investment model 
which explicitly comprises capital market imperfections using a proxy for internal fi-
nance, and accounts for coexistent irreversibility by controlling for the range of inaction 
caused by sunk costs. The empirical specification has a two sided Tobit structure. The re-
sults of this model are compared to results of a simpler linear benchmark model disregard-
ing the impacts of irreversibility. Both models are applied to a Monte Carlo panel and the 
estimations are repeated several times. The simulation results are summarised as follows: 
– Imperfect capital markets and sunk costs induce a range of inaction and thus a kinked 
investment function depending on the cash flow. Under these conditions the linear 
benchmark model provides only correct significance levels of the parameter estimates 
and shows a lower goodness of fit than the Tobit model.  
– Under conditions of perfect capital markets accompanied by irreversibility the estimates 
of the linear benchmark model show a significant cash flow parameter even though an 
impact of the cash flow on investments is not modelled. As expected, the Tobit 
specification provides correct estimates.  
These outcomes indicate how the results of linear models may lead to a mis-interpretation 
of the impact of financial variables on the optimal (dis)investment volume. Generally 
speaking, Tobit models are able to account for both, the three investment regimes caused 
by irreversibility and the capital market imperfections. Consequently, this class of models 
should be preferred in proving empirically the determinants of the firms’ investment vol-
ume. Furthermore, empirical studies accounting for capital market imperfections should 
be critically examined since these do not include the range of inaction caused by sunk 
costs in the respective models.  
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